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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAMIEN A. CANDLAND, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 2011073 8-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE MISCONSTRUES CANDLAND'S LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 
The State asserts that Candland5s reliance on State v. Love 11, 2011 UT 36, 262 
P.3d 803, is misplaced because Lovell was decided under a "prior version of the Plea 
Withdrawal Statute under which a rule 11 violation sufficed to permit withdrawal of a 
plea" and that State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, 279 P.3d 371, "significantly alter[s] the 
analysis55. See Aplee. Br. at 11-12. The State also asserts that Candland argues that the 
controlling test "is one of strict compliance with the Requirements of Rule ll.55 See 
Aplee. Br. at 11. 
The State misconstrues Candland5s legal argument. While Lovell was decided on 
an older statutory version of Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(a), which only required a showing 
of "good cause" to withdraw a guilty plea, Candland has not and does not argue that the 
district court erred because he showed "good cause" to withdraw his plea. Rather, 
Candland asserted in his opening brief that his plea was not "knowing and voluntary". 
See Aplt. Br. at 6-7, 9, 11. Moreover, Candland actually asserted that district courts must 
"strictly compl[y] with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty 
plea..." See Aplt. Br. at 7. Candland does not assert that strict compliance means an 
exact recitation of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In fact, in Lovell, this 
Court held, "Strict compliance ... does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation of 
the rights listed ... [T]he substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of 
their rights and thereby understand the basic consequence of their decision to plead 
guilty." Lovell, 2011 UT 36, ^ 14 (citation omitted). Candland asserts that the holding in 
Lovell, that "our cases impose a duty on the trial judge under rule 11(e) to determine that 
a defendant has been affirmatively advised of the rights he is waiving", is still 
controlling. See Id. at <| 12. 
The crux of Candland's argument is that the district court failed to ensure that 
Candland understood the aggravating elements of the murder charge. See Alexander; 
2012 UT 27, <[ 35( "for a plea to be knowing and voluntary, a defendant must possess 
more than a conceptual understanding of the nature of the offense; he must have an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.") (internal citation omitted). 
The State asserts that Candland did understand the aggravating elements of the 
offense and that the record shows that his confusion related only to the aggravated assault 
charge. See Aplee. Br. at 20. Candland disputes the State's argument. After the factual 
summary was presented by the prosecutor and the district court asked Candland whether 
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he was pleading guilty "because you did these things," Candland did not answer (R. 264: 
12). After consulting with trial counsel, Candland's trial counsel explained that "one of 
the issues" troubling Candland related to the aggravated assault charge (R. 264: 12). As 
the record shows, Candland's prior counsel only discussed "one of the issues" Candland 
expressed to his counsel. Trial counsel did not discuss the other issue related to the 
aggravated elements of the murder charge (R. 264: 12-13). 
After trial counsel related Candland's concern with the aggravated assault charge, 
the district court stated: 
Mr. Candland, the purpose of my question was to - was I want to make sure I 
understand that you understand that your plea today will conclusively establish, 
will prove that you caused the death of another person, under the circumstances 
that were described, and that you physically harmed another person, causing the 
injuries that were described and that you did these things knowingly or 
intentionally; do you understand that? 
(R. 264: 13). 
With Candland's affirmative response to this question, the State attempts to boot-
strap Candland's answer here to the prosecutor's prior recitation of the factual basis to 
show that Candland admitted to understanding that he committed the murder for the 
purpose of the aggravating elements of the charge. See Aplee. Br. at 16, 20. 
Candland asserts, however, that his affirmative answer to the district court's 
question does not show that he understood how his alleged behavior supported the 
aggravating elements of the crime charged. Rather, this portion of the record shows that 
Candland aclcnowledged only causing the death of another person and physically harming 
another person. Candland was not responding to the district court's prior question of 
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whether he was pleading guilty because he committed the crime as described by the 
prosecutor. Instead, Candland was responding to the question at hand, whether he caused 
the murder and whether he physically harmed another person. 
The fact remains that the district court failed to ensure that Candland understood 
how his alleged behavior supported the aggravating elements of murder. 
The State asserts that the combination of Candland5 s Statement of Defendant in 
Support of Plea of Guilty or No Contest and Certificate of Counsel ("Statement"), and the 
judge's colloquy, are sufficient to show that Candland's plea was knowingly and 
voluntary entered. See Aplee. Br. at 14-16. While it is true that Candland's Statement 
was incorporated into the record, rule 11(e)(4)A) still requires the district court to find 
that the "defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea 
is entered ... and that the plea is an admission of all those elements." 
The State apparently does not assert that a "plea affidavit" alone nor questioning 
by a judge on whether a plea affidavit was signed and understood by a defendant satisfies 
the requirements of rule 11(e) or due process when ensuring a defendant's plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. Rather, a plea affidavit may be used in conjunction 
with the plea colloquy and other "surrounding facts and circumstances." See Alexander, 
2012UT27,f 31. 
The fact that Candland had a formal 9th grade education (R. 141), is reason 
enough for the district court to determine during the plea colloquy whether or not 
Candland actually understands "the law in relation to the facts." Merely asking 
Candland whether he understood his Statement does not let the district court know 
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whether Candland truly understood how the aggravating elements related to his murder 
charge. Candland asserts that due process requires more. Due process requires that the 
district court ensure that a plea is made "knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." See Alexander, 2012 
UT 27, Tf 16 (citation omitted). 
Despite the Statement, Candland hesitated and did not answer when the district 
court asked him about the aggravating elements of the murder charge (R. 264: 12-14). 
Candland asserts that his confusion is apparent when taking into account his failure to 
answer arid the letters he later sent to the court. For these reasons and the reasons set 
forth in his opening brief, Candland asks this Court to allow him to withdraw his plea. 
II. STATE V. CORWELL IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THIS CASE 
The State does not dispute that the district court failed to mention Candland's 
waiver of his right to appeal. Instead, the State asserts that because the judge 
incorporated Candland's Statement into the record, "the established law did not require 
further explanation from the trial court". See Aplee. Br. at 24. Candland disagrees and 
asserts that State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, 114 P.3d 276, is distinguishable, and that due 
process requires more in this case. 
In Corwell, the defendant, Corwell, and a co-defendant, entered Sery pleas, and 
Corwell subsequently moved to withdraw her plea asserting a rule 11(e) violation for the 
district court failing to mention her "speedy" trial rights and not specifically delineating 
the limits placed on her right to appeal if she pleaded guilty. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 1. 
The district court denied the motion. Id. at ^ 8. 
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The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court failed to discuss the 
right to a "speedy" trial and failed to inform Corwell of the specific limitations on her 
right to appeal. Id. at 19. 
On certiorari, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals. Regarding whether 
leaving out the word "speedy" during the plea colloquy violated rule 11(e), this Court 
observed that a plea affidavit was incorporated into the record, which informed Corwell 
that she had the "right to a trial in open court by an impartial jury" and that she was 
waiving "that right by pleading guilty." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f^ 4. Trial counsel 
indicated on the record that he had reviewed the plea affidavit with Corwell and believed 
that she understood it. Id. In addition, the district court asked Corwell whether she had 
sufficient time to review her plea affidavit and whether she understood its contents. Id. 
at f 5. Corwell responded affirmatively. Id. The district court went on to have a colloquy 
with both defendants regarding the trial that was set the following Monday. Id. Both 
defendants affirmed that they understood they were giving up the trial scheduled for the 
following Monday by pleading guilty. Id. 
This Court noted that "strict compliance" does not require a district court to follow 
a "particular script." Id. a t f^ 12. This Court found that Corwell "had an adequate 
conceptual understanding of her right to a speedy trial," given the fact that the trial was 
scheduled to begin only one business day after she entered her plea and given the fact that 
the district court repeatedly warned her that she would be giving up her "trial next 
Monday." M a t If 19. 
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Regarding the right of appeal, this Court disagreed that rule 11(e) required the 
district court to explain the "numerous appeal issues that she [would] waive[] by pleading 
guilty." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 20. Instead, this Court held that rule 11(e) does not 
require "a detailed explanation of how a guilty plea may affect the particular grounds for 
appeal." Id. This Court also held that "the district court is not required to separately 
communicate the individual aspects of a defendant's limited right to appeal." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
This Court further observed that "just prior to the plea colloquy," the following 
exchange Occurred: 
trial counsel for Corwell's co-defendant informed the district court that defendants 
were going to plead guilty under Sery, reserving their right to appeal the denial of 
their motions to suppress. The court, providing clarification, responded by stating 
that a Sery plea, "so everybody is clear on that, means you can appeal it." 
Id. at ffl[ 6, 21, n. 3. In the same footnote, this Court concluded, "This statement, 
informing defendants that they could appeal the denial of their motions to suppress, is 
consistent with the fact that their rights to appeal were otherwise limited." Id. at f 21, n. 
3. In addition, this Court noted that while the district court "did not discuss the limited 
right of appeal" during the plea colloquy, the "plea affidavit adequately described the 
limits on her right to appeal...." and the plea affidavit was properly incorporated into the 
record. Id. at f 21. Accordingly, this Court held "that the record supports the district 
court's conclusion that Corwell was informed of her limited right of appeal." Id. 
Candland asserts that Corwell does not support the State's argument that a plea 
affidavit properly incorporated into the record, without further explanation from the 
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district court, satisfies due process or rule 11(e). The district court must determine for 
itself whether a defendant understands the constitutional rights being waived. 
In this case, the district court never discussed with Candland or Candland's 
counsel that he would be waiving his right to appeal if he pleaded guilty. This case is 
distinguishable from Corwell, since the district court in Corwell specifically stated and 
explained on the record during the same hearing when the plea was entered, the fact that 
the defendant could file an appeal on the motion to dismiss. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28, 
f 21 n. 3. In this case, however, the only comment by the district court referencing an 
appeal was the awkward exchange made just after the prosecutor gave the factual basis 
for the charge, wherein the district court stated: "Those facts are sufficient to establish the 
charge against you. Now, my conclusion on that point is something that you would not 
be able to appeal; do you understand that, sir?" (R. 264: 10). 
While the district court: enquired of Candland whether he read through and 
understood his Statement, the district court never enquired of Candland's counsel 
whether counsel believed that Candland understood the rights he would be waiving by 
pleading guilty (R. 264: 7). Moreover, the district court's sole reference to an appeal was 
made referring only to the proffered factual basis against him and the district court's 
statement that Candland could not appeal the district court's conclusion that "[tjhose facts 
are sufficient to establish the charge against you." (R. 264: 9-10). 
By only telling Candland that he could not appeal the conclusion that "[t]hose 
facts are sufficient to establish the charge against you," the district court failed to 
ascertain whether Candland understood that he was waiving his right to appeal his 
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conviction if he pleaded guilty. Taken in context, where Candland hesitated and did not 
clearly admit to the factual basis and where the district court did not clarify that by 
entering a plea, he would not only be waiving the right to appeal a legal conclusion but 
his right to appeal the entire conviction, there is little reason to speculate as to why 
Candland asked that his plea be withdrawn the very next day due to confusion. 
As set forth in Candland's opening brief, the district court reviewed the entire 
record when considering Candland5s motion to withdraw his plea, and the district court 
should have recognized that it failed to adequately ensure that Candland was aware that 
he would be waiving his right to appeal his entire conviction, rather than just waiving his 
right to appeal a legal conclusion (R. 258: 15). 
For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in Candland5s opening brief, Candland 
asks that he be allowed to withdraw his plea. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Candland asks this Court to reverse the district court's 
denial of his motion to withdraw plea, and to remand this matter to the district court with 
instructions to grant the motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ) H _ day of February, 2013. 
Aaron P. Dodd 
Counsel for Appellant 
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